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JOSEPH NELLIS I
NONEXPERT WrmEssEs IN INSAN-
ITY CASES.-[Tex.] The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals in Winn
v. State, 126 S. W. (2d) 481 (1939)
held that laymen, with no special
knowledge of mental disorders,
may still give their opinion as to
an accused persons sanity or in-
sanity. Although a five minute
observation and conversation with
defendant, it was observed, was not
sufficient to express a nonexpert
opinion, a person unskilled in the
study of the mind could, after hav-
ing a reasonable opportunity for
observation, express his opinion as
to the mental condition of the ac-
cused. While some jurisdictions
limit nonexpert opinion to conclu-
sions drawn from specific facts dis-
closed by observation or conversa-
tion People v. Witte, 350 Ill. 558,
183 N. E. 622 (1933); or require
the witness to have reasonable
time to observe the accused Bass
v. State, 219 Ala. 282, 122 So. 45
(1929); Langhorn v. State, 105 Tex.
Cr. R. 470, 289 S. W. 57 (1926); or
be an "intimate acquaintance" of
the accused People v. Carskaddon,
123 Cal. App. 177, 11 Pa. (2d) 38
(1932); or require the witness to
have observed the accused at the
time of the crime or for a reason-
able. period preceding it State v.
Aeschbach, 107 N. J. Law 433, 153
Atl. 505 (1931), all jurisdictions al-
low non-professional observers to
state their conclusions as to the
mental coidition of a person
charged with crime.
It will be readily admitted that
the most desirable procedure in in-
sanity cases is one that will facili-
tate the judgment of the jury.
Desiring reliable judgments then,
are we to allow a lay-observer to
give his own opinion as to whether
the accused is or is not capable of
having the mental element neces-
sary to commit a crime? Gener-
ally nonexperts may not express
their opinion on subjects about
which they know little or nothing
but lay-opinion in insanity cases
has been an exception to this rule,
for it was believed that a man's
mental condition is a matter of
common knowledge; that anyone
who comes into contact with an in-
sane person can tell in a reason-
able time that such person lacks
his mental faculties. United States
Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 407,
412; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) §568.
But how far are the unskilled
and inexperienced witnesses able
[425]
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to reach a reliable decision? There
are forms of insanity of which the
outward signs can be recognized
only by those who are familiar and
skilled in the field of mental dis-
orders. Williams, The Insanity
Plea, p. 26. All insane people do
not live up to the concept of the
raving mad which movies -and
novels develop. Likewise, insan-
ity may be feigned and a layman,
realizing the actor is not behav-
ing normally, can easily be-led to
believe him insane. But where a
layman may be fooled, an expert
can detect a malingerer. John C.
Goodwin, Insanity and the Crim-
inal, pp. 88, 97.
Conversely, a true paranoid, for
example, often has a defense pat-
tern which is so subtle that a lay
observer may be led to believe that
the defendant is perfectly sane. The
writer has had the expeiience of
watching the majority of a uni-
versity class in elementary psy-
chology beguiled into believing,
after conversation with a paranoid
patient, that the latter was un-
justly incarcerated in a State in-
stitution.
We allow an individual to testify
that a person was apparently ill
but we never allow a layman to
say that one has some particular
disease. If we believe that he is
incompetent to give his opinion,
based on his observations, as to the
nature of a physical ill, he certain-
ly should not be heard to speak
on mental ills which in many cases
are more difficult of comprehen-
sion. The classification and symp-
tomatology of mental diseases can
be approached with scientific per-
spective only by an expert.
The facts upon which an un-
skilled witness bases his conclu-
sions may not be symptoms of in-
sanity at all but may be merely due
to the fact that a person is over-
wrought by an emotion or due to
a weighty burden or a slight phys-
ical malady which makes the ac-
tions of the accused veer from the
line of normality and hence leads
the average man to suspect insan-
ity; whereas the expert would not
conifuse the outward signs of a
troubled or emotional mind with
those of a diseased mind.
Nonexpert witnesses in insanity
cases have also been an exception
to the opinion rule-which disal-
lows lay conclusions in matters of
scientific specialty-because it was
supposed that the facts upon which
the opinion is based are of such a
nature that they cannot be ade-
quately presented to the jury; that
the nonexpert cannot fully portray
the outward manifestations of the
deranged mind so that .the jury
can fully appreciate the queer an-
tics upon which the observer has
based his opinion. 4 Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed. 1923) §1934. Per-
haps this may be a valid reason for
allowing nonexperts to testify in
insanity cases and give their opin-
ion if experts were not available,
but men trained and experienced in
the study of mental disorders can
now be procured, and their opin-
ion, based on sufficient observation
of the defendant coupled with the
exactitude of a scientist eliminates
the necessity of accepting the opin-
ion. of one who is not equipped to
render a reliable decision. The
courts, when they allow nonex-
pert opinions on the ground that a
witness cannot explain why he be-
lieves one to be insane, admit that
the witness has no objective tests
of insanity and that his opinion of
necessity must be visceral in na-
ture.
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The courts, realizing that there
must be some point or limitation
where culpability is erased by lack
of responsibility, sought to devise
legal tests to determine that point.
In the earlier law the "wild beast"
rule was in vogue. If a person
was 'so deprived of his under-
standing and memory that he
knew no more what he was doing
than an infant, a brute or a wild
beast, then he was not responsible
for his social transgressions. Rex
v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764
(1724). But as the law developed
so did the rules of responsibility
until today the law reports are re-
plete with tests of various kinds.
The most common is that the ac-
cused must be so deranged that he
cannot distinguish between right
and wrong (People v. Marquis. 344
Ill. 261, 176 N. E. 314, 74 A. L. R.
751 (1931)) or that the mental dis-
ease so destroys his power to
choose that it alone causes the
crime. Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212,
154 So. 575 (1934). All of the
States are in agreement that mere
mental weakness or slight sub-
normality does not immunize
against responsibility for crime.
Daniels v. State, 186 Ark. 255, 53
S. W. (2d) 231 (1932). Now what
layman, even with a reasonable op-
portunity for observation, can
safely give as his opinion that a
person is on one side or the other
of the point where culpability
starts? Sanity is a norm, the devi-
ations from which occur by. im-
perceivable gradations, the meas-
urements of which are subtle and
at times uncertain. Maudsley, Re-
sponsibility in Mental Disease, p.
38 et seq. The courts do not al-
ways deal with the obvious cases
but those on the borderline appear
most frequently and offer the
greatest difficulty. And yet it is
with the latter that the unskilled,
untutored, and inexperienced are
permitted to give their opinion
which at most could be but a be-
lief unfounded in science or skill,
a suspicion or mere guess.
Realizing that procedural reform
is needed in criminal insanity
cases, the Committee of the Ameri-
can Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology, appointed by Dean
Wignore, submitted an expert tes-
timony bill for adoption. 30
Harvard Law Rev. 537 et -seq.
(1917); Bill approved by Dr. S.
Sheldon Glueck in Mental Disorder
and the Criminal Law, p. 487; Dr.
Win. A. White, Insanity and the
Criminal Law, p. .143. This bill
provides for expert witnesses
called by the court, with fees paid
by the county, to examine the de-
fendant and render a written re-
port on their findings. 'It gives
ample time for investigation and
would enable the experts to have at
their disposal the fullest possible
information about the individual to
be examined. The enactment . of
this measure would assure un-
biased, expert testimony and would
pr ovide the courts with a proced-
ure which would be more likely to
result in just decisions than the
present practice. Cf. Expert Tes-
timony Statute -of the Committee on
Medico-Legal Problems, 25 J. Crim.
L. 467 (1934).
In civil cases the courts are
quick to demand that a witness
qualify himself as an expert before
he is allowed to testify in a special-
ized field. Piehl v. Albany R. Co.,
162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122 (1900);
Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160,
106 N. W, 237 (1906). But in crim-
inal insanity cases, where the life
of the accused may be at stake, or
an outrage against society may go
unpunished, any man, with or
without any special knowledge or
skill is still allowed to express an
opinion on a highly specialized and
scientific matter. Thus it appears
that courts deal more appropriate-
ly with property interests than
with life or liberty.
E. R. REYNOLDS, JR.
Accnssoav AFTER THE FAcT-TRIAL
AFTER THE AcQUiTTAL OF.- PIN-
ciPAL.-[Colo.] Although at com-
mon law a conviction of the prin-
cipal was necessary before there
could be a trial of the accessory
after the fact, by statute in most
states the modern crime of acces-
sory after the fact has been broad-
ened into a substantive offense,
apart from the principal crime. It
is essential for the conviction of
the accessory that the principal
crime be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but conviction of the ac-
cused principal is not a prerequisite
to trial of the accessory. Hatchett
v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 925
(1882); Howard v. People, 97 Colo.
550, 51 P. (2d) 594 (1935).
In the recent case of Robert v.
People, 103 Colo. 250, 87 P. (2d)
251 (1939), one Roberts and one
Wier were separately charged with
murder and each accused the other
of committing the offense. Roberts
was tried and acquitted of the mur-
der charge, but was then charged,
under C. S. A. 1935, sec. 14, c. 48,
as an accessory after the fact and
Wier was named as principal felon.
Upon the acquittal of Wier the in-
formation was amended, and the
crime was alleged to have been
committed by unknown persons.
However, in spite of the amend-
ment, the state offered evidence.
which tended only to prove that the
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principal crime had been commit-
ted by Wier. Roberts was con-
victed of being an accessory and
the conviction was upheld by a di-
vided court, which observed that it
was not prejudicial to charge that
the principal crime had been com-
mitted by unknown persons and
then to offer proof that it had been
committed by Wier. The decision
rested on the question of whether
or not Roberts could be convicted
as accessory after Wier had been
acquitted of the principal offense;
and this the court resolved affirma-
tively.
The issue raised is, what effect,
if any, should conviction or acquit-
tal of the alleged principal have in
the trial of the accused accessory.
The opinions of the courts differ
widely and the decisions may be
divided into three groups: first,
that the verdict given in the prin-
cipal's trial (especially if for ac-
quittal) is conclusive evidence of
the principal's guilt or innocence
in the trial of the accessory; sec-
ond, that it is prima facie evidence
of the principal's guilt or inno-
cence, but may be rebutted by the
other evidence offered; and third,
that the verdict in the principal's
trial is not admissible into evidence
in the trial of the accessory, and
that the guilt of the principal must
be established de novo at the sub-
sequent trial.
Most of the early cases held that
the final decision in the trial of the
principal felon conclusively deter-
mined his guilt or innocence; and
in the trial of the accessory, that
matter was considered res judicata.
Because it was a separate substan-
tive crime, the accessory could be
tried and convicted before the
principal, but if the principal were
subsequently acquitted it was gen-
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erally held that the accessory must
necessarily be released and all
charges against him dropped. A
number of the more recent deci-
sions, including the dissent in the
present case, and Heyen v. State,
114 Neb. 783, 210 N. W. 165 (1926),
have followed this view arguing
that it would be anomalous to al-
low the redecision of the guilt or
innocence of the principal by
means of this collateral method or
for the law at once to hold the
principal both innocent and guilty
of the same offense.
Because of the presumption of
innocence, and the general policy
in criminal law of giving the ac-
cused every reasonable opportunity
to prove his innocence, many
courts have abandoned this first
view and have allowed the accused
to offer additional evidence to re-
but the presumption of the prin-
cipal's guilt created by the record
of his previous conviction. Terry
v. State, 149 Ark. 463, 233 S. W.
673 (1921); Anderson v. State, 63
Ga. 675 (1878). They allow this
by reasoning that conviction and
guilt are not necessarily synony-
mous, that if through some miscar-
riage of justice, a principal is
wrongfully convicted, there should
not be a second unpreventable
wrongful conviction merely be-
cause of the first; consequently the
accused accessory should be al-
lowed to offer evidence to set aside
this prima facie evidence of the
principal's guilt. While this argu-
ment was originally offered for the
benefit of the accused, it is capable
of being inverted and used by the
state against him. For just as
conviction does not always prove
guilt, acquittal does not invariably
establish innocence. Woody v.
State, 10 Okla. Cr. 322, 136 P. 430
(1913). The view taken today
seems to be that a judgment for
conviction and judgment for ac-
quittal should be given equal value.
People v. Beintner, 168 N. Y. Supp.
945, 36 Cr. R. 336 (1918). If on the
trial of the accessory a judgment of
conviction of the principal does not
bind the defendant when offered
by the state then a judgment of ac-
quittal should not bind the state
when offered defensively by the
defendant. But if the acquittal is
entered as prima facie evidence the
state has the added burden of
overcoming this presumption as
well as the general burden of prov-
ing the case. Justice Buller in An
Introduction to the Law Relative to
Nisi Prius (6th ed..1793) suggested
that the presumption created by an
acquittal be open to a collateral at-
tack even when the presumption
created by a conviction is not, and
reasoned that a conviction is the
result of the establishment of the
proof of guilt but that an acquittal
is not the result of a proof of in-
nocence but only that for some
reason the suit before the court
has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt by the evidence.
However, the instant case. goes
further and eliminates all such
presumptions of guilt or innocence
by holding that the record of the
acquittal should not even be en-
tered into evidence in the trial of
the accessory but that the principal
crime must be proved entirely from
evidence of witnesses who con-
front the accused at his trial. The
Colorado court bases its 'decision
on People v. Beintner, supra, which
is based on Kirty v. United States,
174 U. S. 47 (1899). The Kirby
case holds that under the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution,
providing that "In all criminal
430 RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
prosecutions the accused shall .. .
be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . ." a conviction in
a larceny case could not be entered
even as prima facie evidence
against a person charged with the
separate offense of receiving stolen
goods since the, accused was in no
way connected with, the other trial
and evidence was not given in his
presence. The Beintner case trans-
fers this .reasoning to the case of
an accessory after the fact where
the principal had been previously
acquitted; and it seems open to
question whether the reasoning can
be logically so transposed that a
constitutional provision, intended to
give added protection to an ac-
accused, can be used against him
to prevent him from admitting evi-
dence in connection with which he
has not been confronted with the
witnesses for and against him. It
would seem that the accused might
waive the benefit of the provision,
that it would be analogous to a
judgment after a plea of guilty; it
could hardly be contended that the
provision should be extended so as
to be a benefit to the state. The
coilrt justifies the transition by us-
ing the general argument (supra),
that a judgment for conviction and
a judgment for acquittal are of
equal significance and that the ac-
cused cannot prevent the one from
being entered into evidence and yet
offer the other as evidence. While
this might generally be the rule
and while logically an acquittal
might usually be more open to a
collateral attack than a judgment
for conviction, it could hardly be
argued that there could be no ex-
pressed exception to this rule and
it would appear that the provision
in the Constitutional Bills of Rights
would provide such expressed ex-
ceptions.
Another ground for upholding
the decision that the principal's
former acquittal should not be ad-
mitted into evidence is furnished
in the case of People v. Buckkind,
13 Wendell (N. Y.) 593 (1835); in
that case the principal had been
acquitted and the alleged accessory
was being tried for withholding
evidence of the offense from the
authorities. The trial court refused
to admit the acquittal into evi-
dence and the Supreme Court of
Judicature upheld the trial court
by reasoning that since the judg-
ment for acquittal was or may
have been produced by the ac-
cused's own criminal act of with-
holding evidence from the authori-
ties, he was estopped from plead-
ing it. In the instant case it would
seem logical to estop the defendant
from pleading the acquittal of
Wier since, by withholding evi-
dence from the authorities and by
assisting in the concealing of the
crime, he aided in the procurement
of that acquittal.
While the group of cases is com-
paratively small where an alleged
accessory after the fact is tried
after the one alleged as principal
has been acquitted, there seems to
be substantial and growing author-
ity for holding that the record of
the former acquittal should not be
offered into evidence against the
accessory. People v. Buckland,
supra; People v. Beintner, supra;
Commonwealth v. Long, 246 Ky.
809, 56 S. W. (2d) 524 (1933); and
the instant case; although the cases
are still decidedly split the three
ways. Since the parties must
establish the proof of the principal
crime without the aid of former
court record where the principal
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has not been apprehended or tried,
it would not, it seems, work a
hardship on the parties to prove,
and defend against proof, of the
principal's guilt without the aid of
court record after the principal
trial. Since juries often acquit for
othei reasons than that they think
the one tried is innocent, to allow
the admission of an acquittal or
conviction would give the evidence
an unfair weighting, and one in




DENCE OF CONSPIRACY WHERE No
CONSPIACY IS CHARGED IN THE IN-
DICTMENT.-[IIl] Defendant was
indicted for malicious mischief, in
that he injured and defaced a
building and its contents. At the
trial evidence was admitted which
showed that the defendant had
conspired with others to injure not
only the building in question but
others as well. Upon writ of error
it was held that evidence of con-
spiracy is admissible even though
-no conspiracy is charged in the
indictment. It was further held
that the fact that such evidence
may disclose other offenses does
not alter the rule. People v. No-
votny, 20 N. E. (2d) 34 (Ill. 1939).
The cases are legion in which the
defendants have objected, because
no conspiracy was charged in the
indictment, both to the admission
of evidence of a conspiracy to com-
mit the crime charged and to the
propriety of submitting the case to
the jury on a conspiracy instruc-
tion. Uniformly the courts have
overruled all such objections, have
allowed the evidence, and have ap-
proved of instructions based there-
on. Ray v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky.
656, 20 S. W. (2d) 484 (1929); cf.
Commonwealth v. Darry, 221 Mass.
45, 108 N. E. 890 .(1915); the de-
cisions are collected in an exten-
sive annotation to this case in 66
A. L. R. 1311. The rule is thus
stated in Wharton, Criminal Evi-
dence (11th ed., 1935) §725:
"Neither is it necessary that the
conspiracy be alleged in the in-
dictment when that is' not the
charge being prosecuted and its
existence is sought to be estab-
lished merely as an incidental or
evidentiary matter in that it is a
foundation for the admission of
acts and declarations of co-con-
spirators which depend on such
conspiracy; it is sufficient for this
purpose that the- conspiracy is
shown to exist in fact." The acts
and declarations of the co-con-
spirators thus made admissible
may be used as "substantive evi-
dence against any co-conspirator
on trial. When once the conspiracy
is established the act or declara-
tion of one conspirator or accom-
plice in the prosecution of the en-
terprise is considered the act "or
declaration of all and therefore im-
putable to all." Wharton, Criminal
Evidence (11th ed., 1935) §700: For
cases illustrating this theory see
Van Riper v. U. S., 13 F. (2d) 961
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926); State v. Ritter,
197 N. C. 113, 147 S. E. 733 (1929).
The rule of evidence where a
conspiracy is shown is said to be
the same as where a conspiracy is
charged. Robinson v. U. S., 33 F.
(2d) 238 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); Gill
v. State, 59 Ark. 422, 27 S. W. 598
(1894). But since the evidence of
conspiracy in no event can be ad-
missible except to prove the crime
charged, it seems sensible that the
evidence should be explained to
the jury where no conspiracy is
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charged. And so the practice has
been to instruct the jury as to the
effect of the evidence. See 66 A.
L. R. 1311, 1314. If no conspiracy
is established the judge should ad-
monish the jury to disregard the
acts and declarations of co-con-
spirators. If a prima facie case of
conspiracy is made out the evidence
may go to the jury but in any event
the court should instruct the jury
that its competency will depend on
a finding that the conspiracy ex-
ists in fact. Burns v. Stage, 155
Ark. 1, 243 S. W. 963 (1922); Cook
v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 766, 43
S. W. (2d) 1 (1931); People v.
Baxter, 245 Mich. 229, 222 N. W.
149 (1928); Ormsby v. People, 53
N. Y. 472 (1873).
While it may seem that failure to
instruct the jury as to the purpose
of admitting conspiracy evidence
where no conspiracy is charged
would be prejudicial to the defen-
dant, precisely the opposite has
been held. In Powers v. Common-
wealth, 197 Ky. 154, 46 S. W. 436
(1922) the court said that failure
to submit the case under a con-
spiracy instruction where there is
evidence thereof, while not a good
practice, is beneficial, not preju-
dicial, to* the defendant because it
merely meant that there was one
less theory upon which the defen-
dant could be convicted. This
may be true in cases where a
conspiracy instruction is used
for the purpose of establish-
ing some particular element of the
crime, to make out one theory of
the state's case. Cook v. State, 169
Ind. 430, 82 N. E. 1047 (1907).
Cases of this type, where a con-
spiracy instruction is used to estab-
lish some particular element of the
ctime, are not infrequent. Thus in
Dorsey v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky.
223, 17 S. W. 183 (1891) the court
said: "It will be observed that the
defendants were neither indicted
nor tried for entering into a con-
spiracy. They were only charged
with murder the language of which
was in due form and the essential
element of it is rnalice afore-
thought. The proof of conspiracy, if
any, would be conclusive proof of
such premeditation." And so in
People v. Looney, 324 Ill. 375, 155
N. E. 363 (1927) the court in-
structed the jury that if they found
a conspiracy it would establish a
motive for the crime. Obviously,
failure to make this type of instruc-
tion which is merely a judicial ex-
pression of the effect of certain evi-
dence might be beneficial rather
than prejudicial to the defendant.
But on the other hand instructions
on conspiracy evidence where no
conspiracy is charged do not only
serve the purpose of establishing
essential elements in the state's
case. They should also be used to
warn the jury of the limitation up-
on the use of the conspiracy evi-
dence, namely, that it is to be con-
sidered only in so far as it estab-
lishes the commission of the crime
charged and that the acts and
declarations of co-conspirators are
not to be considered unless the
conspiracy has been established in
fact. Failure to precaution the
jury as to such matters might more
than offset the benefits to the de-
fendant of the court's failure to set
out the state's theory of the case.
The rule of the instant case,
everywhere followed, is approved
by the courts so mechanically and
dogmatically that one might expect
it to be above reproach. There are,
however, two dangers in allow-
ing evidence of conspiracy where
none is charged. The first and
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most serious objection to this prac-
tice which may and has been
raised, is that the basic purpose of
the indictment, namely, to inform
the defendant of the crime with
which he is being charged, is being
disregarded. That the accused has
a right to be informed about the
nature and cause of the accusation
against him, is fundamental. Hur-
tado v. California, 110 U. S. 516
(1884); and has been embodied in
many state constitutions and stat-
utes. The need for this obviously
is to give the defendant opportun-
ity to prepare his defense.
The problem involved in these
cases, then, is whether or not the
defendant may reasonably expect
evidence of conspiracy. In this re-
gard it seems highly important
whether he was jointly indicted or
is the only one charged with the
crime. If the defendant was jointly
indicted, though no conspiracy was
charged, it does not seem unrea-
sonable that the joint indictment
would be sufficient notice of itself
that there might be evidence show-
ing a conspiracy. Cook v. State,
169 Ind. 430, 82 N. E. 1047 (1907).
The court remarked that ".
the allegations in the indict-
ment showing that this crime was
committed jointly by the parties
named therein were sufficient to
authorize the state to introduce
any competent evidence to prove
or sustain the conspiracy in con-
troversy . . .". But where the de-
fendant alone is indicted for the
crime charged it is less obvious
that he should expect and be pre-
pared to defend against evidence
of a conspiracy to commit the
crime in question. This was recog-
nized in State v. Kennedy, 177 Mo.
98, 75 S. W. 979 (1903), where the
court observed that "the better
practice is to make all the con-
spirators parties defendant to the
indictment, or to aver therein the
existence of such conspiracy, the
parties thereto, if known, and their
purpose, for then the defendant, on
trial, will have reason to anticipate
what evidence will or may be of-
fered against him and prepare to
meet the same, otherwise he will
not." A perusal of the cases re-
veals that almost all of them in-
volve joint indictments. Those few
where the defendant is singly in-
dicted, however, seem to lay down
the same rule without recognizing
that any different considerations
are involved.
Secondarily, there is danger that
the jury will be misled by the evi-
dence and convict the defendant of
a crime with which' he is not
charged, namely, conspiracy. This
danger may, of course, be mini-
mized by adequate instructions.
That both of these dangers may
become serious where the rule, is
blindly followed is well illustrated
in the case of Ray v. Common-
wealth, 230 Ky. 650, 20 S. W. (2d)
484 (1929). The defendant Ray
was indicted for robbery. The in-
dictment stated "that the Defendant
Ray was then and there present
and near enough to and did unlaw-
fully, feloniously, and fraudulently
aid, abet, and assist his co-defen-
dant to commit the robbery afore-
said." The defendant gave as his
alibi that he was in Louisville some
forty miles away from the scene
of the robbery at the tirie of its
commission. The court inistructed
the jury "that it might find Ray
guilty if it should believe he en-
tered into a conspiracy with George
Gagnon to rob Vittitoe of his
whisky and Gagnon did rob him
as a result of such conspiracy, and
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in pursuance thereof and while the
same existed." The verdict as
rendered by the jury read as fol-
lows: "We the jury find the de-
fendant guilty of conspiracy and
sentence him to six years in the
penitentiary!" The trial judge in
the presence of the jury altered it
so as to read, "we the jury -find
the defendant Ray guilty as
charged in the indictment and fix
his punishment at confinement in
the penitentiary for six -years."
The verdict as altered was then
read to the jury and they were
asked if that was what they meant
and they answered in the affirma-
tive. As the dissent points out
under the instruction given "the
defendant would have been con-
victed, although the jury may have
believed his alibi, for the verdict
which the court changed was that
the jury found the defendant
guilty not of robbery nor of aiding
and abetting, but of conspiracy."
The injustice is obvious for no one
would believe that the defendant
would have to be prepared to de-
fend himself, beyond showing that
he was not present at the scene of
the crime nor so nearly so-aiding,
assisting and abetting-as in fact
to make him a joint principal with
Gagnon.
The instant case represents one
of that smaller group wherein the
defendant was singly indicted and
yet evidence of conspiracy was ad-
mitted though not charged. The
court does not even discuss the
question of whether or not the de-
fendant was adequately informed
to defend himself, or whether the
jury may have been misled by the
evidence of conspiracy. This may
have been because there was suf-
ficient direct evidence of the com-
mission of the crime by the defen-
dant; or it may have been because,
the court was beset by a corollary
problem, namely, could the evi-
dence of conspiracy admissible un-
der the general rule, include evi-
dence of other offenses? The
majority held that it clearly could
include evidence of other crimes.
Three justices in a concurring
opinion objected to allowing evi-
dence of other similar offenses
merely because the crime was com-
mitted pursuant to a conspiracy.
They maintained that proof of
other offenses must be justified as
showing proof of a common design,
or intent, or to negative a theory
of accident; but in any case on con-
siderations independent of whether
or not the crime involved a con-
spiracy. But the minority seem to
be engaging in legalistic hair-
splitting; for if the other offenses
revealed are part of the conspiracy,
as they must be under any rule,
they will necessarily show a com-
mon design.
CHARLES MARTIN.
COMMENT BY DisTRICT ATTORNEY
ON FAILURE OF AccusED TO TEsTIFY.
-[Va.] The ruling in Elliott v.
Commonwealth, 1 S. E. (2d) 273
(Va. 1939), that a comment by the
district attorney on the failure of
the accused to testify must be pre-
sumed to do irreparable harm to
the defendant, and renders the
case reversible ipso facto, aligns
Virginia with the minority which
clings tenaciously to what seems to
be an erroneous rule of law. Hunt
v. State, 28 Tex. App. 149, 12 S. W.
737, 19 Am. St. Rep. 815 (1889);
Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209, 36 Am.
Rep. 132 (1880); for collected cases,
see 3 Am. Jur. 616, 84 A. L. R. 799.
The weight of authority holds
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that such comments, though highly
improper, may, when the evidence
of defendant's guilt is clearly estab-
lised, work no injury, where the
trial judge promptly intervenes,
excluding the comments and ad-
monishing the jury to disregard
them. In other words, comments
of that kind stand on very much
the same footing as other improper
arguments, and whether they call
for a reversal or not depends on
whether, after a full consideration
of all the circumstances, including
the action of the trial judge at the
time they were made, the appellate
court is of the opinion that no
prejudice resulted. People v.
Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291, 44 N. E. 976
(1896); Commonwealih v. Rich-
mond, 207 Mass 240, 93 N. E. 816,
20 Ann. Cas. 1269 (1911); for col-
lected cases, see 3 Am. Jur. 616,
84 A. L. R. 795.
The rule, that comments on the
accused's failure to testify are not
allowed, is auxiliary to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination,
which came into the common law
at a time when the defendant was
not guaranteed the right to coun-
sel, to confront the witness against
him, speedy and public trial, nor
any of the other safeguards which
are now his. Masser, Right of
Prosecuting Attorney to Comment
on the Defendant's Failure to Take
the Stand, 22 Cornell L. Q. 392
(1937). The privilege was incor-
porated into our State and federal
constitutions, but there was no
need for the rule in question be-
cause the defendant was not a com-
petent witness until more than
sixty years after our country was
founded. 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) §579. This disquali-
fication was universal until 1864,
when Maine passed the first com-
petency statute, granting the de-
fendant the privilege of testifying
if he so desired, and forbidding
comments if he chose not to. Me.
Stat. 1865, c. 280. Now by statute,
constitutional provision, or deci-
sion the prosecuting attorney-and
usually the court- is denied the
right to comment on defendant's
failure to take the stand in prac-
tically every state in the union. 4
Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923)
§2272; for lists of the statutes, see
Restatement, Administration of the
Criminal Law (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1931) pp. 35 if.
The statutes themselves, with the
exceptions of those of Iowa and
Oklahoma which embody the
minority rule, do not mention the
effect of a violation. Therefore, it
appears that the legislative intent
was that a breach of this trial
rule should be treated as any
other. And the general rule in all
trials is that where an improper
argument is addressed to the jury,
the attention of the judge shall be
called to it at once and he will per-
mit it to proceed or end it, but.in
an event will adequately rule on
it in the charge to correct any. er-
roneous effect. Commonwealth v.
Richmond, 207 Mass. 240, 93 N. E.
976, 20, Ann. Cas. 1269 (1911). No
sound reason appears why this rule
of practice should not apply to un-
warranted arguments by the dis-
trict attorney. At most this will
be merely giving judicial sanction
to realities, it being generally
recognized that the jury considers
the defendant's failure to testify.
4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923)
§2272.
The argument so often advanced
that such a comment renders the
trial unlawful and hence reversible
ipso facto begs the question. It is
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merely an application of the theory
that all statutes changing the com-
mon law must be interpreted
strictly. This theory is one of in-
ertia and maintenance of status
quo, and should not, without
further support, prevail over the
legislative intent. This view is
supported by the fact that nearly
all of the states now have statutes
providing for liberal interpretation.
In the instant case, as pointed out
by the dissent, there is an example
of these statutes, which provides in
part that, "No judgment . . . shall
be arrested or reversed . - . for
any error committed on the trial
where it plainly appears from the
record and the evidence . . . that
the parties have had a fair trial on
the merits and substantial justice
has been reached . . .". Va. Code
1919, §6331.
The minority ruling seems to be
a hold-over of the former Ex-
chequer Rule, which made the law
of evidence an end in itself-an
end so independent of justice, and
so superior thereto that it had to
be maintained even at the cost of
justice. Crease v. Barrett, 1 C. M.
& R. 919, 932. The Exchequer Rule
is based on fallacious theories, and
its practical workings are lament-
able, causing delay, expense, injus-
tice, and popular distrust of justice.
I -Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923)
§21. And yet the instant case is a
glaring example of its tenacity.
Here, every requisite of the well
established majority rule was ful-
filled. It was conceded that the
evidence presented by the Com-
monwealth was sufficient to sustain
the verdict of the jury. The trial
judge immediately intervened, ade-
quately instructing the jury on de-
fendant's privilege, excluding the
comment and admonishing them to
disregard it. The only basis for
such a decision is the fact that an
unjustifiable rule of law still sur-
vives.
W. McFAAND.
